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An International Comparison 
of Work Sharing Programs 
R.W. Crowley 
and E. Huth 
This article draws together primarily unpublished informa-
tion that provides comparative information with respect to North 
American and Western European expériences with work sharing. 
INTRODUCTION 
The notion of sharing available work to maintain employment levels is 
not new. In some socialist countries, in fact, it is the basis for the claim that 
unemployment does not exist.1 In North America, large unions hâve long 
recognized their rôle in defining work norms to maximize employment and 
hence union membership. One can trace the origins of formai work sharing 
programs at least to the 1930s when various programs were put in place to 
combat the Great Dépression.2 The only such continuous formai program 
of work sharing is in Germany where it has been operative for slightly more 
than 50 years. As in ail countries with established work sharing programs, 
the current Canadian program has grown from humble roots to quite an ex-
tensive size. In 1982, about 200,000 workers across the country participated 
in the program and the program is expected to expand even more in 1983. 
In the light of this, it is surprising that there is not more available infor-
mation comparing expérience in différent countries. Hence, the purpose of 
this article is to draw together primarily unpublished information that will 
provide such comparative information with respect to North America and 
Western Europe. For those readers unfamiliar with the work sharing pro-
* CROWLEY, R.W., Executive Advisor, Stratégie Policy and Planning, Eimployment 
and Immigration Canada. 
HUTH, E., Student, University of Waterloo. 
î There may also be other «word games» at work. In 1979, one junior communist party 
member (tongue in cheek) reported in response to a question on the extent to which young peo-
ple were experiencing difficulty finding jobs. «There are no unemployed youth in China; we 
hâve only youth waiting for employment.» This ranks with the widely reported observation of 
a very senior Chinese officiai visiting the United States: «We hâve no prostitutes in China; but, 
we do hâve a problem with women in large cities such as Shanghai who exchange sex for 
money». 
2 F. BEST, Work Sharing: Issues, Policy Options and Prospects, Kalamazoo, 
Michigan: The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1981. 
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gram in Canada, we commence with a brief description of that program. 
Table 1 provides a summary comparison of programs to the work sharing 
program in Canada. 
CANADA 
In August 1977 amendments to Section 38 of the Unemployment In-
surance Act resulted in the 1977 inauguration of an expérimental work shar-
ing program in Canada.3 The main objective of this program was to avert 
layoffs. The initial expérimental program (during with work sharing was 
implemented in 24 différent situations) ended in 1979 but a more widely 
available program was initiated in January 1982. During 1982, approx-
imately eighty-three million dollars was spent on work sharing compensa-
tion. This amount is équivalent to almost 1% of the total expenditure for 
unemployment insurance. There were approximately 181,000 work sharing 
benefits récipients in 1982, as compared to 3,201,000 regular claimants. 
Canada's work sharing program is administered by the Canada 
Employment and Immigration Commission and involves a formai agree-
ment among the employer, employées, and the fédéral government. A work 
sharing agreement is for a maximum of twenty-six weeks but the Commis-
sion may extend an agreement for a further twelve weeks if it appears the 
return to full employment will take longer than originally forecast or if it 
seems a permanent work réduction is inévitable. In the latter case, work 
sharing would be extended to provide for a phased réduction in the work 
force through attrition. Employers cannot reapply for work sharing until 
one year after the commencement of their last work sharing agreement. 
To receive approval to implement work sharing, an employer must sub-
mit an application to the Commission demonstrating that certain criteria 
are met. The firm must be an established enterprise which has been 
operating for at least two years; the need for reduced output must be 
unavoidable; firms must be capable of returning to normal production at 
the end of work sharing period, employers and employées must agrée on the 
need to initiate work sharing; and initially, firms must hâve a work réduc-
tion of at least twenty per cent to be deemed eligible for work sharing. 
(Subsequently, work réduction may fall to 0% — for a maximum of six 
weeks — or reach a maximum of 60%, but it must be a minimum 10% over 
the life of the agreement.) 
Employées must also fulfill certain eligibility requirements. Since work 
sharing is an élément of the unemployment insurance System, the entrance 
requirements are the same; employées must hâve had ten to fourteen weeks 
of insurable employment before the commencement of work sharing. The 
level of work sharing benefits is based on the loss in normal average weekly 
earnings. Workers receive a proportion of the weekly regular employment 
insurance benefit equal to the proportion by which the normal weekly earn-
3 For a discussion of the origins of work sharing, «Work Sharing and Layoffs», In-
dustrie Relations/Relations industrielles, cf. R.W. CROWLEY, Vol. 34, No. 2, 1979, pp. 
329-334. 
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ings hâve been reduced. (Normal weekly earnings are calculated as the 
average of weekly earnings for the 20 most récent weeks of full employment 
with the work sharing employer.) 
Work sharing claimants may earn income from secondary employers 
up to 25% of what whould be a full weekly U.I. payment. Earnings in ex-
cess of this amount are deducted from work sharing benefits. 
Work sharing is funded by the regular unemployment insurance fund. 
However, unlike regular U.I. récipients, work sharing claimants are not 
currently required to serve a two-week waiting period. The programs also 
differ in that regular U.I. entitlement requires seven days without earnings 
before a claimant is said to hâve experienced an interruption in earnings, 
whereas a work sharing participant is deemed to hâve experienced an inter-
ruption in earnings when the work sharing agreement starts. Employée en-
titlement to regular unemployment insurance benefits is not affected should 
there be a layoff at the conclusion of a work sharing agreement. 
CALIFORNIA 
Among work sharing programs elsewhere, the California Shared Work 
Unemployment Insurance Program4 is most similar to Canada's. In 1978, an 
18-month expérimental work sharing program was established. It was ex-
tended for an additional two years in 1979 and is now considered an ongo-
ing program. The program aims to be an alternative to layoffs and to serve 
as an adjustment mechanism by allowing employées to look for new jobs 
while working short time for firms facing permanent staff réductions. To 
date, participation in California's shared work program has been limited, 
no doubt partially reflecting the low level of benefits compared to regular 
employment earnings (or compared to Canadian work sharing benefits). 
During 1982 there were 1,200,000 regular unemployment insurance 
claimants compared with 90,000 short-time compensation récipients. 
The program is administered by the California Employment Develop-
ment Centre which also administers unemployment insurance, disability in-
surance and the California State Employment Service. The Administrative 
procédures are relatively simple. Employers are required only to complète a 
two-page application form which includes names of affected employées, in-
formation on the size of earnings and hour réductions, and a statement that 
work-time réduction is an économie necessity. There is no requirement to 
document or prove that a work-time réduction cannot be avoided, nor is it 
necessary to state the number of layoffs that will be averted.5 
4 Based on unpublished internai assessments by Canada Employment and Immigration 
officiais who interviewed California officiais; California Shared Work Unemployment In-
surance Evaluation, Sacramento, Health and Welfare Agency and Employment Development 
Department; May 1982. 
5 This is estimated later from employer data regarding the size of the employers' work 
force and their utilization of work sharing benefits. 
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If an employer^ application is approved, and both the employer and 
employées are deemed eligible to participate in the program, employer s pro-
vide participating employées with a statement of reduced hours and wages. 
Employées in turn use this statement to claim short-time benefits. After an 
initial claim is filed personally by an employée at the local branch of the 
Employment Development Department, benefits are received by mail 
directly from the State. 
To be eligible to participate in the work sharing program an employer 
must face an anticipated work réduction of 10% involving at least 10% of 
the work force. If employées are unionized, the employer must reach an 
agreement with the collective bargaining unit in order to enter into a work 
sharing agreement. Worker agreement is not necessary if there is no union. 
Since the work sharing program opérâtes under the aegis of the 
unemployment insurance program, employées must meet the same criteria 
for benefit eligibility. During 1980 this required that a California worker 
must hâve earned at least $900 in the preceeding 12 months in order to 
qualify for the minimum benefits of $31 per week. The ceiling on benefits, 
$120 per week (or $24/day), is payable to workers with earnings of $4,160 
or more in the highest quarter of the preceding 12 months or «base period». 
The amount of unemployment insurance payable to a work sharing clai-
mant is proportional to the réduction in the work week. 
Unlike practice in Canada, ail work sharing claimants must serve a one 
week waiting period before receiving initial short-time benefit. After this 
waiting period is served, a claimant may receive compensation for up to 
twenty weeks in a fifty-two week period. Extensions are not granted. 
If workers are laid off at the conclusion of the work sharing program 
they are eligible to receive unemployment insurance, but for a shorter dura-
tion to reflect the dollar cost of benefits received under work sharing. 
However, an employée who is laid off immediately following work sharing 
will receive unemployment insurance at the same rate as under work shar-
ing. (Since this rate is determined using base earnings in the quarter one year 
prior to claiming benefits, workers who make claims one year after par-
ticipating in work sharing may hâve their benefit level effected.) 
In California work sharing coverage and entitlement are assigned to 
employées and not attached to firms. Firms, therefore, hâve a great deal of 
freedom while participating in the program. An employer can vary work 
réduction on a week-to-week basis from 0 to 100% (in the case of 100%, it 
becomes a week of unemployment benefits and does not count against the 
employées allotted twenty weeks of short-time benefits). Employers are not 
restricted in their personnel décisions: they are free to transfer, hire or fire 
employées while participating in the program. Provisions for fringe benefits 
hâve been left to the discrétion of employers. 
Employées receiving work sharing benefits are not obliged to seek work 
actively, as are regular unemployment insurance claimants, unless the 
employer is using the program as a transitional mechanism to a future per-
manent work réduction. Income from secondary employers is deducted 
from work sharing benefits. 
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In California, the unemployment insurance fund is financed by govern-
ment contributions and by a payroll tax paid by employers. This l:ax varies 
from 0.5% to 3.9% of taxable wages (currently $6,000/year for each 
employée). Employers with large positive unemployment insurance reserve 
balances are taxed at the lowest rates. Ail unemployment insurance benefits 
paid to a firm's former employées are charged against its account. Work 
sharing users whose unemployment insurance benefit charges exceed their 
contributions (négative reserve balance users) must pay a supplementary tax 
ranging from 0.5% to 3.0%. This surtax helps to ensure the solvency of the 
unemployment insurance fund but, more importantly, it also aids in 
discouraging non-stable and/or seasonal employers from using the work 
sharing program. This requirement is considered to be effective in ac-
complishing thèse goals since relatively few négative reserve balance firms 
participate in the program. 
Recently, the U.S. Department of Labour has drafted model législation 
for use by state governments considering work sharing programs.6 This 
model législation largely reflects the California case, though there are some 
différences. It spécifies that employers should continue to provide health 
and retirement benefits while participating in the shared work program. It 
also suggests that employée eligibility for short-time compensation be 
limited to a maximum twenty-six weeks during any twelve month period. 
The California State government has been considering amending its législa-
tion to increase from twenty to twenty-six weeks the initial period during 
which benefits are available and implementing «triggering» extensions 
whenever, and as long as, the unemployment rate is above 7.5% 
GERMANY 
The Short-Time Allowance Program in the Fédéral Republic of Ger-
many7 has been in effect for over fifty years. The objectives of the program 
are to maintain employment and to assist employers in preserving their 
trained work force. The increasing importance of this program as économie 
conditions deteriorate is demonstrated by its growth: 350,000 récipients 
(1.3% of the labour force) in 1981 had expanded to 600,000 in 1982 and the 
forecast for 1983 is 800,000. Table 2 shows, however, that there has been 
considérable variation over time in the use of the program, presumably 
reflecting changes in économie conditions. 
The German Short-Time Allowance Program is administered by the 
Fédéral Employment Institute, an independent organization composed of 
représentatives of labour, business and government. The Institute also ad-
ministers unemployment insurance and other labour market measures, 
though thèse programs are operated separately from work sharing. 
6 Draft Législation, Washington, U.S. Department of Labour, August 1982. 
7 Based on correspondence with the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, F.R.G.; E. YEMIN, éd. 
Work force Réductions in Undertakings, Geneva, International Labour Office, 1982; and R. 
BEATTY, Review of Work-Sharing (Short Time Benefit) in Europe. Ottawa Department of 
Manpower and Immigration, unpublished paper, March 31, 1977. 
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The program is available to ail firms with at least one paid employée. It 
is not available to firms in seasonal industries or firms whose hours are ir-
regular. In order to be eligible for work sharing, an employer must 
demonstrate that short-time working is due to économie causes, that it is 
temporary and that ail steps hâve been taken to avoid this situation. To 
receive government approval to introduce work sharing, an employer must 
initially require a work réduction of at least 10% affecting no less than a 
third of the work force for four weeks. Short-time working weeks are only 
sanctioned if, in accordance with the Works Constitution Act, both 
management and employée représentatives agrée to it. An employer who 
receives approval for work sharing pays employées their short-time benefits 
and, in turn, is reimbursed by the Fédéral Employment Institute. 
To be eligible to receive short-time allowances, employées must be on 
the employer's payroll at the time the application is submitted and must also 
be making unemployment insurance contributions at that time. Eligibility is 
not dépendent on past employment. The level of benefits is based on the last 
wage earned in the month preceding the commencement of reduced working 
weeks. To simplify administration, employers are provided with lists of five 
wage levels and instructed to identify which level best approximates the 
wage of each affected employée. An employee's short-time allowance then 
consists of sixty-eight per cent of this amount. The légal maximum period 
for which benefits may be received is six months, but the Minister of 
Labour has always had the right to extend this period for a further six mon-
ths. Recently, because of the deteriorating labour market conditions, ail 
manpower centres hâve been authorized to routinely approve extensions for 
up to eighteen months. The Minister of Labour has also been empowered to 
approve extensions in the German steel industry for up to thirty months. 
Once full-time work has been resumed, a three month period must elapse 
before an employer may reapply for work sharing benefits. 
While participating in the work sharing program, employers are 
generally not permitted to hire or fire employées. A work réduction of at 
least 10% must be maintained or the employer ceases to be eligible. During 
work sharing the employer must continue to make contributions to pension 
funds and health insurance. (The Fédéral Employment Institute pays 75% 
and 50%, respectively, of each of thèse contributions.) Employées face only 
one restriction. They are required to report earnings from secondary 
employment which are then deducted from short-time benefits. In cases of 
layoffs following short-time work, there is no réduction in unemployment 
insurance entitlement. 
Work sharing benefits are financed with regular unemployment in-
surance premiums. Thèse premiums are now 4.5% of gross wages up to a 
maximum level of insurable earnings and are shared equally by employers 
and employées. Any déficit the Fédéral Employment Institute accumulâtes 
is financed by the State. The déficit is forecast to be approximately five 
billion deutschmarks (2.5 billion dollars) in 1983. 
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SWEDEN 
The administration of Swedish labour market policy is focussed on the 
workplace. Both regular unemployment insurance and work sharing are ad-
ministered by unemployment insurance societies, which are close ly linked 
with nationwide unions. Thèse societies are financed by members' dues, 
employers fées and government grants. The régulations governing work 
sharing resuit from employer/employée agreements and the spécifies 
therefore vary from case to case. The détails of the following discussion per-
tain to the Swedish métal workers union.8 
To be eligible to obtain work sharing compensation, an employée must 
meet basically the same criteria required for unemployment insurance. 
Claimants must be available for work on days not worked. Any money 
which is earned on thèse days is deducted from short-time compensation, 
unless the claimant had a permanent second job prior to receiving work 
sharing benefits. 
There are no régulations stating how many layoffs must be prevented 
or how large a work réduction is required for a firm to introduce work shar-
ing. However, each individual work sharing agreement will most likely re-
quire a certain work réduction. Swedish officiais claim that union interest in 
the unemployment fund limits abuse and makes it possible for the state not 
to hâve to détermine a firm's eligibility to participate in work sharing. 
In the métal industry, an agreement has been reached between 
employers and the union confirming that for the first five days during 
layoffs and reduced working weeks, employers pay employées full salaries. 
After this initial five day period, reduced working weeks may continue for 
up to twelve or fifteen weeks. 
The maximum benefit payable to work sharing claimants is 230 
kronor/day ($38) while the average is 200 kronor/day ($33). This is approx-
imately two-thirds of the daily average income of an industrial worker. 
Some local agreements between employers and unions specify that 
employers will compensate employées for the différence between unemploy-
ment benefits and full salary. 
An employée who is laid off after having received reduced working 
week benefits is eligible to receive unemployment insurance, but entitlement 
to thèse benefits is reduced by the number of days for which short-time com-
pensation was received. 
8 Based on information from Swedish Labour Counsellor's Office, Embassy of 
Sweden, Ottawa, Ontario, «Swedish Labour Market Policy», Fact Sheet on Sweden, August 
1981. 
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FRANCE 
Work sharing in France9 is most often used in cases of a temporary 
décline in demand, although it sometimes serves as a prélude to a permanent 
work réduction. It is considerably différent from programs in other coun-
tries. The program is administered by the State and not by the same in-
dependent organization that administers unemployment insurance. 
An employer considering a work réduction must first consult (not 
necessarily obtain agreement of) the Works Committee within the establish-
ment. An application must then be submitted to the Department of Labour. 
To be given approval to implement work sharing, the expected work réduc-
tion must affect no less than 10% of the firm's work force and must be no 
greater than five hours per week. 
Ail employées who are bound by contract to stay with a firm, and who 
sustain a réduction in salary because of a reduced working week, are eligible 
to receive partial unemployment benefits. Seasonal workers are eligible to 
receive short-time benefits if they can prove that in preceding years they had 
earned a regular salary at the specified time of year. Short-time compensa-
tion generally represents 70% of the minimum wage ($1.80) (10F 97L/hr. as 
of July 1, 1982). A worker is eligible to receive work sharing benefits for a 
maximum of 600 hours per year. 
Usually, work sharing benefits are paid by employers who in turn 
receive a partial reimbursement from the government. The State may com-
pensate for up to 80% of the payments that an employer makes. In some 
cases, a modest amount of public assistance may be paid directly to in-
dividuals. 
Ordinarily, agreements for short-time compensation hâve a maximum 
duration of six months. If the firm continues to require work force réduc-
tion after this period, the agreement can be renewed for the same length of 
time. If necessary, one further extension can be granted when the first 
renewal is exhausted. Entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits is 
not affected, if there is a subséquent layoff. 
Under work sharing employers are not permitted to hire new workers. 
As well, they are prohibited from hiring or laying off employées without the 
approval of the Department of Employment. Employées are restricted from 
accepting secondary employment during the hours for which they receive 
work sharing benefits. 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom,10 the Temporary Short-Time Working Com-
pensation Scheme came into effect for a five year period beginning in 1979. 
9 Based on correspondence with the Canadian Embassy, paris, France; « Work-Sharing 
in Europe», Ottawa, Department of Manpower and Immigration: unpublished paper May 20, 
1977; and E. YEMIN, (éd.), Workforce Réductions in Undertakings, Geneva, International 
Labour Force 1982. 
10 Based on correspondence with the Canadian High Commission, London, U.K. and E. 
YEMIN, (éd.), Workforce Réductions in Undertakings, Geneva, International Labour 
Organisation, 1982. 
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Initially, clothing, textiles, and footwear firms were the heavy users of this 
scheme; engineering firms hâve now become prédominant. Since its incep-
tion about three million workers hâve benefitted. 
Employers must submit applications for compensation to the Depart-
ment of Employment if they wish to initiate short-time compensation. They 
must demonstrate that at least ten workers are facing imminent layoff and 
that the décline in work is temporary with a reasonable expectation of retur-
ning to full employment. Positions for which the employer requests support 
must not be presently receiving any other government assistance. Most 
employées are eligible for short-time compensation with the exceptions of 
casual and seasonal workers (excluding construction workers). Part-time 
workers working more than sixteen hours per week and construction 
workers are also eligible. Both unions and management must agrée to in-
volvement in the work sharing scheme before it can be implemented. 
Employées must receive benefits from employers equal at least to 50% 
of their normal wage for the hours by which their work week is reduced. 
Earnings from secondary employment are not considered in determining 
benefits. Employers are reimbursed by the government for the minimum 
payment, up to a maximum of sixty pounds ($113) per week. This reim-
bursement can continue for a maximum of six months. Employers are not 
permitted to apply for an extension of short-time compensation for the 
same jobs. They are, however, able to apply for subsidies for other posi-
tions threatened with redundancy. If this is done, the Department of 
Employment undertakes a rigorous examination to ensure that the 
employer has not simply dissembled the formerly subsidized positions. 
Employers must give a ninety day notice before employées can be declared 
redundant and laid off. If this notice is given while the employée is receiving 
short-time compensation, the employer is required to repay the subsidy. 
Therefore, an employée is generally ensured of at least ninety days of work 
following the conclusion of short-time working. An employee's entitlement 
to unemployment benefits is not affected if laid off after receiving short-
time compensation. 
While participating in the program, firms must provide ail affected 
employées with at least one full day of employment for every seven con-
sécutive days without work. If this commitment cannot be fulfilled, the sub-
sidy is stopped. The subsidy for a spécifie short-time job is also discon-
tinued if the employée is declared redundant. Should the firm later become 
insolvent, subsidization is stopped and the employer is required to repay ail 
money granted for reimbursement of short-time employées wages from the 
date insolvency was clearly suspected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The six work sharing programs examined in this paper are generally 
similar in design and intent, although certainly there are différences in 
détail. (See Table 1.) With the exception of the U.K., in ail of the schemes 
secondary earnings reduce work sharing compensation. In Canada, 
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claimants are able to earn up to twenty-five per cent of a full weekly 
unemployment insurance payment before the weekly benefit level is reduc-
ed. In the others, secondary earnings are deducted from work sharing 
benefits. Ail of the programs hâve work réduction requirements for 
employer eligibility, with the spécifies of thèse requirements varying from 
country to country. In ail but the Swedish program, employers face restric-
tions concerning the amount of work réduction necessary for continued 
eligibility, but again thèse conditions vary from program to program. With 
the exception of the United Kingdom where construction workers are eligi-
ble, seasonal workers are not covered. 
Employée eligibility is generally not based on previous employment; 
Canada and California are the exceptions in this case. The level of benefits 
is approximately two-thirds of normal salaries (up to a maximum) in most 
countries, though in the United Kingdom it is only 50% of normal salary. 
Six months is the standard maximum duration of the benefit period, but in 
Sweden it is only half this long. Except in California, employers are not free 
to hire new workers while they are participating in work sharing. 
A work sharing benefits claimant's future unemployment insurance en-
titlement is not af fected in three of the countries but is reduced in California 
and Sweden. The treatment of fringe benefits is also not standard; in 
Canada, California and the United Kingdom no légal provisions are made, 
while in the others they are continued during the term of the work sharing 
agreement. The California program is the only one in which claimants must 
serve a waiting period before receiving work sharing benefits, though in the 
Swedish variant the employer pays full salary for the first five days. 
Ail in ail, a diversity of détail but a commonality of purpose. With 
respect to the future, one can expect increasing attention to innovative pro-
grams such as work sharing as policy makers grapple with ways to deal with 
adjustment problems. 
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Table i 
A Comparison of Work Sharing Schemes as of January, 1983 
Coverage 
Employed 
Eligibilily 
Seasonal workers 
are not covered 
Based on previous 
employmeni 
Seasonal workers 
are not covered 
Based on previous 
employment 
Seasonal workers 
are not covered 
Not Based on 
Previous Employ-
ment 
Construction Seasonal workers 
workers are eligible are not covered 
Not Based on 
Previous Employ-
ment 
Not Based on 
Previous Employ-
ment 
Work Réduction At least 20% work Al least 10% work At least 10% work At least 10 No spécifie requin'-
Necessary for réduction affecting réduction affecting réduction affecting employées threaten- ment (see text) 
Employer Eligibility at least 2 employées 10% of employées one-third of work ed with redundancy 
force 
Level of Benefits Received at same Received at some 68% of normal 
rate as LU., for rate as LU., for salary 
number of hours by number of hours by 
which work week which work week 
has been reduced. has been reduced. 
Waiting period None 1 week None 
Minimum is 50% of Average is 2/3 nor-
normal salary mal pay of in-
dustrial worker 
For first five days 
employer pays full 
France 
Seasonal worker', 
arc covered (if they 
can prove they nor-
mally are employed 
at that time of year) 
Not Based on 
Previous Employ-
ment 
Work réduction 
must affect no Icss 
than 10% of 
employées 
70% of normal 
salary 
Benefit Period 
Extension 
26 weeks 20 we< 
Extensions subject None 
to C.E.I.C. ap- (see te 
proval 
May be extended May not apply for None 
for 1 1/2 yrs. (2 1/2 extensions for same 
yrs. in steei industry positions 
May be extended 
for 24 weeks 
Effect on Future No effect 
LU. Entitlcmenl 
Treatment of Fringe No provisions 
Benefits 
No provisions Contributions con- No provisions 
tinued (sec text) 
Reduced 
Not affected Provisions arc made 
for their contimiu-
Treatment of secon- Employées able to 
dary earnings 
Restrictions on 
Employer 
Ail secondary earn-
ings deducted from 
benefit 
earn up to 25% of : 
full weekh LU. 
benefit payment. 
Secondary earnings 
in excess of this 
amount are 
deducted. 
Generally not free 
to hire. Maximum 
permissiblc réduc-
tion is 60% over life fire and lay-off 
of program reduc- employées 
tion must be at least 
10 per cent. 
AU secondary earn-
ings deducied from 
benefit 
Secondary earnings 
do not affect short 
time benefit 
Secondary earnings 
reduce benefit 
Work réduction Generally hiring and Firm must provide Not free to hire 
may vary from 0 to lay-offs are not per- employées with one 
100%. Free lo hire, mitted. Must con- full day of employ-
tinue to require a ment for every 
10% work réduction seven consécutive 
affecting 10% of 
employées 
without work day 
Not applicable 
(see text) 
Generally hiring and 
lay-offs are not per-
mitted 
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Table 2 
Annual Averages of Unemployment and Worker 
under Short-Time Compensation, West Germany 
Year Registered Registered 
Short-time Unemployment 
Workers (000's) 
(000's) 
1968 10 323 
1969 1 179 
1970 10 149 
1971 86 185 
1972 76 246 
1973 44 273 
1974 292 582 
1975 773 1,074 
1976 277 1,060 
1977 231 1,030 
1978 250 1,000 
1979 n.a. n.a. 
1980 135 889 
1981 350 1,272 
1982 600 n.a. 
1983 800 est. 
Source: Best, Fred and James Mattesich, «Short-time compensation Systems in California and 
Europe», Monthly Labour Review, vol. 103, no. 7, (July 1980), pp. 13-22, and for 
1980, 1981, 1982 the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, F.R.G.; O.E.C.D., Main Economie 
Indicators, Paris: November, 1982. 
